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SUPREME COURT REVERSALS: EXPLORING THE

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Stephen J. Wermiel*
Reversals are a hot topic. No longer is the meaning of reversals
relegated to scholarly journals for analysis of judicial behavior. In recent
years, due in large measure to criticism of the record of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,' interest in reversals has found its way into the
daily news media and has become the focus of articles, speeches and blog
debates.
This is a dramatic change. It was not that long ago that the highly
respected Judge Frank M. Coffin of the First Circuit described the role of a
federal appellate judge in much more humble, much less visible terms:
The appellate judge lacks the broad-ranging influence ofthe legislator and the
specific levers of power of the executive. And he possesses almost no
visibility. The appellate judge's immediate audience are his colleagues who
sat with him when an appeal was argued. A slightly wider audience are the
lawyers and parties in the litigation. Later, the audience may include a few
more judges, lawyers, and law professors who someday will read his opinion.
Reaction, favorable or unfavorable, is rare, confined to a law review
comment, a reference in another court's opinion, or possibly an affirmance
or reversal by the Supreme Court, months or even years after the work is
done. Unlike the trial judge, whose decisions often place him uncomfortably
in the headlines, editorials and cartoons, the appellate judge is generally a
media cipher.3

*
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3.

Associate Director, Marshall-Brennan Constitutional Literacy Project, and Adjunct Professor, both
at American University Washington College of Law. The author thanks Jillanne Schulte and Daniel
Scialpi, law students at Washington College of Law, for their assistance.
This criticism is discussed in: Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48
ARiz. L. REV. 341 (2006). See also Stephen J. Wermiel, Exploring the Myths About the Ninth
Circuit,48 ARIZ. L. REV. 355 (2006).
For one such blog dispute, see O'Reilly Echoed Right Wing Falsehood that Supreme Court
Overturns 9th Circuitat a "RecordRate, " Media Matters (Dec. 15, 2005), http://mediamatters.org
/items/200512150016 (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 7

(1980).

Southern Illinois University Law Journal

[Vol. 32

Today, there is truly a new image for federal judges, a federal appellate
judiciary that has a loyal almost-groupie-like following4 and a set of statistical
enthusiasts who take a back seat only to the zeal of sports statistical buffs.
The heightened interest in the issue of the significance of reversals is
undoubtedly fueled in part by this new and growing interest in the circuits and
their judges. The blog, How Appealing,5 devoted to the work of appellate
courts, has brought new attention to the circuits among lawyers and nonlawyers, alike. Sometimes there is even a focus on the circuits as social
structures at the blog, Above the Law,6 which relates personal news and
developments about circuit judges and circuit law clerks.
This essay will briefly explore several issues related to reversals,
meaning the reversal of federal circuit court decisions by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The focus is to examine the impact that reversals may have on the
reputation of a circuit court. In particular, this essay will explore why the
Ninth Circuit seems to be more widely criticized than, say, the Seventh
Circuit, although neither court has a stellar reputation when measured in terms
of Supreme Court reversals.
First, this essay will consider the significance of the Supreme Court's
increased use of decisions reversing or vacating and remanding federal
appeals court rulings. Second, this essay will consider the record of individual
circuit courts, examining the Seventh Circuit in comparison to the Ninth
Circuit and to other circuits. Third, this essay will provide brief case studies
of the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit, which received little or no
publicity or public comment. Fourth, this essay will consider and compare the
role that a few individual judges play, not so much in contributing to the
reversal statistics, but in shaping the image of a circuit through news media
coverage, commentary and academic analysis.

4.

5.
6.

Consider the recent comments made by David Lat, blogger at Above the Law,
http://www.abovethelaw.com/. His previous blog was called Underneath Their Robes for which Lat
wrote under the online name, Article IIlGroupie. Asked by an interviewer about his interest in
circuit court judges, Lat replied, "They are the closest thing America has to an aristocracy. They're
life-tenured; they make decisions of great importance that affect millions of people, and within the
legal community, they are idolized." Adele Nicholas, Four QuestionsforDavidLat,Inside Counsel,
Aug. 2007, http://www.insidecounsel.com/section/litigation/1 333?pagenum=6 (last visited Apr. 3,
2008).
http://howappealing.law.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
http://www.abovethelaw.com/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
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I. MORE SUPREME COURT REVERSALS
The critical thing to know about Supreme Court reversals is that there are
more of them-at least as a percentage of the Court's argued cases. The more
difficult question is: why is the Supreme Court consistently reversing more
often?
For most of the last half of the 20th Century, the Supreme Court's
reversal rate, 7 including state and federal courts, was above 50% and below
70%.' A few times in this period, the reversal rate even dipped below 50%.'
Only a half dozen times did the reversal rate go over 70%, and most of those
were during the Warren Court years when the Supreme Court was charting
many a new course.' ° To put the statistics in slightly different-and more
functional-form, during the lifetime of most currently living students of the
Supreme Court, while the Court was more likely to reverse than to affirm, the
likely outcome would have been considered a close call statistically.
According to annual statistics compiled by the National Law Journal,"
from the Supreme Court's October Term 19842 to the October Term 2000, the
reversal rate went over 70% only once in 17 years.' 3
It is curious, then, that for the past six terms, the Supreme Court's
reversal rate has been at a consistent high of 70% or above. According to the
National Law Journal statistics, the reversal rates were: October Term

7.

Reversal rates are calculated in different ways, and comparison of different measures is often
difficult. Some studies include only federal circuit courts and exclude state and federal district
courts. Other studies count only pure reversals and not decisions vacating and remanding cases or
decisions affirming in part and reversing in part. Still other studies include per curiam summary
dispositions on the merits while others examine only fully briefed and argued cases. In this essay,
every effort will be made to explain the source of statistics used.

8.

LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 244-45 (4thed. 2007).

9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id.
For an example of the original, annual charts in the National Law Journal,see David Lauter, In
Moderate Pursuitof Conservative Goals, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2, 1985, at S-3, S-4.
Supreme Court Terms run by law from the first Monday in October to late June the following year.
They are commonly referred to by the year in which the first Monday in October fell. The term that
began in October, 1984, and ran to June, 1985, would be the October Term 1984.
The NationalLaw Journalfigurefor October Term 1996 is a 71% reversal rate. The Supreme Court
Compendium shows a lower 65.9% figure for October 1996. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 8.
The difference may be explained in that the NationalLaw Journal says its statistics include per
curiam decisions in which the Supreme Court may rule summarily on the basis of a petition but
without full briefing and oral argument. See, e.g. Marcia Coyle, In The FirstFull Term..., NATL
L.J., Aug. 1, 2007, at 6. The Supreme Court Compendium includes only fully briefed and argued

12.

13.

cases.
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2001-75%; October 2002-74%; October Term 2003-76%; October Term
2004--71%; October Term 2005-70%; and October Term 2006-74%..
Thus any discussion of reversals and trends in the performance of
particular circuits must take into account that the Supreme Court is reversing
14
lower courts more consistently than at any time in more than 40 years.
Is there any way to explain this development of more consistent
reversals? The short answer is that there is no simple, unitary explanation.
The justices have been silent on the subject, giving no acknowledgment that
they even recognize the existence of a trend or of a change in practice. Indeed,
the only public reference to reversals and the circuits by a justice in recent
memory was the comment in July 2007, by Justice John Paul Stevens at a
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, that the spotlight on the Ninth Circuit's
reversal rate is "misleading." 15
One possible explanation which might seem obvious is somewhat
problematic. It seems logical to conclude that, since the Court is dominated
by a conservative majority, at least four members of that majority16 are
regularly voting to grant review in cases in which they think the lower court
was wrong. The flaw in this explanation is that those four votes would
typically have come from among five conservatives, two of whom recently
retired or died-Justice Sandra Day O'Connor who retired on January 31,
2006, and Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, who died on September 3,
2005-and were replaced by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., and Justice
17
Samuel A. Alito Jr.
This explanation assumes that the replacement of Rehnquist and
O'Connor with Roberts and Alito made no real difference and that the voting
to hear cases in order to reverse continued apace. While it is certainly
possible that the trend simply continued unabated, the fact that both new
justices arrived from federal appeals courts-Roberts from the D.C. Circuit and
Alito from the Third Circuit"8-might suggest that they would be less
enthusiastic about rushing to overrule the circuit courts. On the other hand,
both Roberts and Alito were exposed to circuit court decision making that they

14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

One indication of the degree of change is found in the work of veteran court commentator Prof.
Henry J. Abraham. As recently as 1986, Prof. Abraham observed about the Supreme Court in a
leading work on the judiciary, "More often than not the tendency is to affirm the intermediate
appellate tribunal, but by no means inevitably." HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 173
(5th ed. 1986).
Pamela A. MacLean, 9th Circuit Reversal Rate Is Misleading, NATL L.J., July 30, 2007, at 14
(recounting Stevens speech in Honolulu to Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference).
Petitions for writs of certiorariare granted on the vote of four justices.
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).

2008]

Supreme Court Reversals: Exploring the Seventh Circuit

645

believed was out of line with precedent and tojudges whose judicial approach
differed sharply from their own. So both men may have arrived quite willing
to continue the pattern of voting to review circuit rulings that they deemed to
be deserving of reversal.
Another factor may also seem obvious but is worth noting. The new
highs in reversal rates in the last few years correspond in time to new lows in
the number of cases being decided by the Supreme Court. While the
phenomenon of the shrinking number of argued and decided cases19 is also
unexplained by the justices,2 ° there may be a simple relationship between the
two patterns. As the Court hears fewer cases, the justices are looking more
actively for cases that require correction and are more willing to pass up
interesting cases that may lead to affirmance of the lower courts. It is not
difficult to see how justices might find an imperative in the need to reverse
some decisions and a less compelling need to put the Supreme Court's
imprimatur on cases with which they agree.
II. LOOKING AT THE CIRCUITS
A. The Numbers
Discussion of reversals of circuit court opinions has long been dominated
by a negative focus on the Ninth Circuit.2 Conservatives have taken to
mocking the Ninth Circuit's record of reversals in the Supreme Court,
suggesting that the statistics establish proof that the Ninth Circuit is populated
with liberal renegade judges who are out-of-step with the mainstream of
American law.22
Examining the reversal statistics, however, suggests that other circuits
ought not to sit smugly by while commentators skewer the Ninth Circuit.
Take the record of the Seventh Circuit. In October Terms 1986, 1987, 1989,
1996, 1998 and 2005, the Seventh Circuit's reversal rate was higher than the

19.
20.
21.

22.

Linda Greenhouse, DwindlingDocket Mystifies Supreme Court,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2006, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/07/washington/07scotus.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
For a full discussion of the decline in Supreme Court decisions, see Arthur D. Hellman, The
Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403.
For a recent example of criticism aimed at the Ninth Circuit, see Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in
the Court: The 9th Circuitis overturnedmore than any other appeals court.Its size may be afactor,
L.A. TIMES, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/
la-oe-fitzpatrickl Ijul I1,0,6274474.story (last visited Apr. 3, 2008).
Id. ("In other words, it is no coincidence that, when you hear about a bizarre ruling issued by a
federal court of appeals, it very likely came from the 9th Circuit."). The author of this column was
a law clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia.
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Ninth Circuit's. 23 And in October Terms 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998,
1999, and 2005, the Seventh Circuit's reversal rate was higher than the
average for the Supreme Court that term.
It is true, of course, that the number of cases the Supreme Court hears
from the Ninth Circuit makes the impact of the reversal statistics seem more
dramatic. In the past 22 years, the Court heard some 260 cases more from the
Ninth Circuit than from the next most reviewed, the Fifth Circuit.2 4 It is also
true that in that 22-year-period, the number of reversals for the Ninth Circuit
is greater than the total for any other three circuits combined. However, the
Ninth Circuit is bigger than all other circuits and decides more cases. This
does not entirely explain the Supreme Court's fascination with hearing cases
from the Ninth Circuit, but size is certainly part of the answer.
Analysis of reversal statistics need not be limited to the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits. The Sixth Circuit has an overall reversal rate since October
Term 1984 of nearly 64.96%, not that far behind the Ninth Circuit's leading
72.95%. The Tenth Circuit is not far behind the Sixth at 63.63%, followed by
the Eighth at 62.29% and the D.C. Circuit at 61.22%.
If high reversal rates are a reason for a circuit to hang its collective head,
then only one circuit may stand tall statistically. The Third Circuit is the only
federal appeals court with a reversal rate over the last 22 years that is under
50%-47.5% to be precise. But even the Third Circuit has had several recent
terms in which 100% of its reviewed rulings were reversed by the Supreme
Court.
When the Supreme Court is operating in reversal gear, none of the
circuits may escape scrutiny, and all ofthe circuits are theoretically vulnerable
to criticism that the reversal statistics raise questions about their judicial
performance.
B. The Misleading Impact of Reversal Statistics
As a general proposition, far too much significance is attached to
reversal rates as a measure of the caliber of a circuit's performance or
abilities. I have argued elsewhere that the reasons for reversals are far from
monolithic and do not always reflect error or criticism of the circuit court.25
Consider several categories of decisions. First, when a circuit decides
a case of first impression, the Supreme Court may ultimately take a different
view. But that dispute is a toss-up in which the Supreme Court is only right

23.
24.
25.

See Appendix I.
See Appendix II.
Wermiel, supra note 1.
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because it has the last word. Second, when the Supreme Court reverses by a
5-4 vote, it is difficult to argue that the circuit ruling was out-of-line or way
off-base; after all, four justices agreed with the circuit. Although making the
observation in a somewhat different context, Judge Richard A. Posner of the
Seventh Circuit observed this point when he said, "In any split decision by the
Supreme Court, to say that one side is 'right'and the other 'wrong' is usually
a naive reaction."26 Third, the Supreme Court may reverse a three-judge
panel's opinion where the panel was made up of liberal and conservative
judges who agreed with each other on the outcome or where the circuit
opinion was actually written by the appointee of a Republican White House;
it is difficult to fit this type of reversal into a mold of Supreme Court justices
holding in check renegade circuit judges. Fourth, when the Supreme Court
reverses one circuit, but that circuit's view of the law was shared by several
other circuits, it is unfair to criticize the reversal rate of the court that was
targeted by the justices. This explains at least some cases in which the
Supreme Court selects a disproportionate number of decisions from the Ninth
Circuit to use as vehicles for resolving circuit conflicts.2 7
In all of these examples, criticism of a circuit for its reversal rate by the
Supreme Court is misplaced. None of these examples can fairly be seen to
reflect negatively on a circuit or on its judges. Many cases that fall into these
categories have been included in the statistics that form the basis of criticism
of the Ninth Circuit.
III. TWO CASE STUDIES: OCTOBER TERMS 2005 AND 2006
A. October Term 2005
In the October Term 2005, the Ninth Circuit's rate of reversal by the
Supreme Court-83% or 12 of 14 cases--drew the usual media scoffing,
commentary and notoriety.28

26.

27.

28.

Howard A. Bashman, 20 Questions for Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, How Appealing (Dec. 1, 2003), http://howappealing.law.com/
20q/2003_12 01 20q-appellateblogarchive.html#107025481874565902 (last visited Apr. 7,2008).
A circuit conflict occurs when two different federal appeals courts decide the same issue of federal
law but reach different results. Rule 10 of the Supreme Court identifies circuit conflicts as a primary
reason for Supreme Court review of a case. SUP. CT. R. 10, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ctrules/2007rulesofthecourt.pdf (last visited on Apr. 3, 2008).
The Fulton County Daily Report, in an account of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, reported,
"And at the Ninth Circuit conference Monday, a presentation by Vikram Amar, a professor at
Hastings College of the Law, said recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions should provide plenty of grist
for future criticism. 'I don't think there's any way around the fact that the Supreme Court keeps a
close eye on what the Ninth Circuit does, and is more critical of its work product,' he said. 'They're
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There was no commentary about the Seventh Circuit's record after the
October Term2005. After all, the Supreme Court only reviewed two Seventh
Circuit cases after oral argument and one in a per curiam summary decision.
Unnoticed because of the lack of public comment that the Seventh Circuit
enjoyed was the fact that the Seventh Circuit received not a single vote from
the justices of the Supreme Court that Term. In a sense the record was not
0-3, but 0-26.29 Moreover, in one of the cases, the October 2005 term marked
the third time the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in the same
case.3" Yet there is no commentary suggesting the Seventh Circuit is
recalcitrant or populated by liberal renegades who must be reined in by the
Supreme Court. In fact, there is no commentary at all noting the Seventh's
Circuit record in October Term 2005.
So let us briefly examine that record. The first case considered by the
Supreme Court from the Seventh Circuit was decided without argument and
briefing, a summary reversal in an unanimous per curiam opinion. The case,
Eberhartv. United States,3 rejected a government claim that a motion for a
new trial should have been time-barred. The Seventh Circuit had accepted the
government time bar in an opinion by Judge Joel M. Flaum, joined in full by
Judges William J. Bauer and Richard A. Posner.32
This example, while a clear and unanimous reversal, serves to illustrate
the earlier point, as well, that statistics miss the nuances and differences that
may explain reversals. The Supreme Court seemingly went out of its way to
observe in this decision:
We finally add a word about the approach taken by the Court of Appeals.
Although we find its disposition to have been in error, we fully appreciate that
it is an error shared among the circuits, and that it was caused in large part by
imprecision in our prior cases... This was a prudent course. It neither forced

29.
30.

31.
32.

less patient with the Ninth Circuit."' Justin Scheck, CircuitBreakers.AtackCase Overload,FULTON
COuNTY DAILY REPORT, July 19, 2006, at 9.
Also, describing one Ninth Circuit ruling, a newspaper editorial remarked, "We know this came as
a shock to some of its Republican critics, but the U.S. 9th Circuit of Appeals has injected some
common sense into the debate" over an Arizona issue. Surprise! 9th Circuit source of common
sense: English-learnerfine rollback acknowledges years of changes, MESA TRIBUNE, Aug. 28,
2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 14895609.
Justice Alito did not participate in one case, so there were a total of 26 votes cast in the three cases.
Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006), reversing Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for
Women, Inc., 91 F. App'x 510 (7th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court had previously considered the
case and reversed the Seventh Circuit as Nat'l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994),
reversing and remanding 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), and Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 537
U.S. 393 (2003), reversing and remanding 267 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2001).
546 U.S. 12 (2005).
United States v. Eberhart, 388 F.3d 1043 (7th Cir. 2004).
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the issue by upsetting what the Court of Appeals took to be our settled
precedents, nor buried the issue by proceeding in a summary fashion. By
adhering to its understanding of precedent, yet plainly expressing its doubts,
it facilitated our review.33
Similar disclaimers could undoubtedly be made by the Supreme Court in some
Ninth Circuit cases, but the Supreme Court does not seem favorably disposed
to offering kind words to the judges of the Ninth Circuit.
The second case that the Supreme Court considered from the Seventh
Circuit was Scheidler v. NationalOrganizationfor Women.34 In this case, the
Supreme Court ruled 8-0 that the federal Hobbs Act35 could not be used
against anti-abortion protesters in the absence of evidence of robbery or
extortion. The unanimous decision was written by Justice Stephen Breyer;
Justice Alito did not take part because he had not yet joined the Court yet
when the case was argued in November, 2005. In this decision, the Supreme
Court reversed the unanimous order of a three-judge panel made up of Judges
Ilana D. Rovner, Diane P. Wood and Terence T. Evans.36
There are two interesting points about this reversal. First, Justice Breyer
notes, politely but pointedly, "Decisions of this Court have assumed that
Congress did not intend the Hobbs Act to have so broad a reach."37 He cites
for this proposition the preceding reversal of the Seventh Circuit in the same
case as well as a concurring opinion in that case by Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg,38 as if to say that the Supreme Court has already addressed this
matter but the Seventh Circuit is not listening. It is also of note that Justice
Breyer commented that other courts of appeals that had considered the scope
of the Hobbs Act had reached the correct result. One case that he cited was
decided-correctly in the Supreme Court's view-by the Ninth Circuit.39
The third case considered by the Supreme Court from the Seventh
Circuit in October Term 2005 was Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust." The
Supreme Court ruled unanimously, in an opinion by Justice David H. Souter,
that a district court order remanding a securities case to state court is not an

33.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.

Id.at 19-20.
547 U.S. 9 (2006). The history of decisions is discussed in supra note 30.

18 U.S.C. § 1951.
Scheidler v. Nat'i Org. for Women, Inc., 91 F. App'x 510 (7th Cir. 2004).
Scheidler, 547 U.S. at 20.
Id. "See NOWI, 537 U.S., at 405, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (noting that the Hobbs Act embodied extortion,
which required the obtaining of property, not coercion); id., at 411, 123 S.Ct. 1057 (GINSBURG,
J., concurring) (coercion, which is not covered by the Hobbs Act, "more accurately describes the
nature of petitioners' (non-property-related] actions" (internal quotation marks omitted))."
Id.at 21 (citing United States v. Yankowski, 184 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 1999)).
547 U.S. 633 (2006).
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appealable order under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of
1998. 4" The Supreme Court reversed an unanimous three-judge panel opinion
written by Frank H. Easterbrook, who is now chief judge of the Seventh
Circuit, and joined by Kenneth F. Ripple and Diane P. Wood.42 This final
example was also a case that involved a split in the circuits. It seems that the
Ninth Circuit had this one right, too, since its decision is cited on the opposite
side of the Seventh Circuit's in a footnote in Justice Souter's opinion.4 3
The point of examining these three cases and the record of the Seventh
Circuit in the October Term 2005 is not to suggest that the Seventh Circuit
should be subjected to scorn or ridicule for securing not a single Supreme
Courtjustice's vote in three cases. Rather, the point is to question whether the
Ninth Circuit is singled out for unfair treatment and scrutiny in public debate
and commentary, when there is much to examine and discuss about the
performance of other circuits, including the Seventh.
B. October Term 2006
In the Supreme Court Term from October 2006 through June 2007, the
Supreme Court reviewed three more decisions from the Seventh Circuit,
reversing or vacating two and affirming one. When the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit in the case of Hein v. Freedomfrom Religion
Foundation,44 many news media stories did not mention that it was Judge
Richard Posner's decision that was overturned.4 5 In Freedomfrom Religion
Foundationv. Chao,46 Judge Posner ruled, 2-1, that taxpayers had standing
in federal court to challenge the use of federal funds to pay for regional
conferences to promote faith-based organizations as eligible for federal social
services contracts.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Alito, ruled 5-4 that the
Seventh Circuit had improperly extended a narrow exception to the general
rule that taxpayers do not have standing to challenge the expenditure of
federal funds. The narrow exception was recognized earlier by the Supreme

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

46.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 403 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2005).
See Kircher, 547 U.S. at 639 n.6 (citing Abada v. Charles Schwab & Co., 300 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.
2002)).
127 S.Ct. 2553 (2007).
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Reject Suit on FederalMoney for Faith-BasedOffice, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 2007, availableat 2007 WLNR 12009797. See also, Jon Ward, High Courtrejects
Suit to Restrict Faith Groups, WASH. TIMES, June 26, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 13542997.
433 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Court in Flast v. Cohen,47 allowing taxpayers to bring Establishment Clause
challenges to Congressional authorizations for spending involving religion.
Judge Posner extended the exception to a program in which the federal funds
were being spent at the President's discretion and not by direct Congressional
authorization. Proposing his own new standard, he suggested that taxpayers
should have standing any time "the marginal or incremental cost to the
taxpaying public of the alleged violation of the establishment clause [is more
than] zero. 48 "The Court of Appeals did not apply Flast49 ; it extended Flast,"
Justice Alito wrote."0 "At a minimum," Justice Alito wrote, "the Court of
Appeals' approach ...would surely create difficult and uncomfortable linedrawing problems."'" While the dissenters would have found standing in this
case, they did not embrace or even discuss Judge Posner's test,5 2 meaning he
received no support at all from the Court for his view.
In a second case, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., the
Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the
case for additional proceedings. The ruling was intended to resolve a split
among the federal appeals courts over a provision of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 4 The law requires a securities
plaintiff to present facts leading to the "strong inference" that the defendant
acted with scienter, which means an intent to deceive or defraud. 5 In defining
the term "strong inference," Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit said it
could be met by facts that would convince the "reasonable person" that the
defendant had intent.56 Writing for the Supreme Court in an 8-1 ruling,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said the appeals court standard was too
deferential to plaintiffs and "does not capture the stricter demand Congress
sought to convey.. . ."" Of interest here, the Seventh Circuit's decision was
in conflict with, among others, a ruling in which the Ninth Circuit had earlier
reached the same result at which the Supreme Court arrived.58

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

392 U.S. 83 (1968).
Chao, 433 F.3d at 995.
Flast,392 U.S. at 83.
Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2571 (2007).
Id. at2570.
The dissent by Justice Souterjoined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, appears at 127 S.Ct.
2584-2589.
127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007).
109 Stat. 737.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
Makor Issues & Rights Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006).
Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2504.
See Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002).
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In the third and final case, Wallace v. Kato,59 the Supreme Court by a 7-2
vote settled a question about the statute of limitations in a civil rights damages
suit 6° against police for an arrest that was contrary to the Fourth Amendment.
The ruling affirmed the decision by Judge Wood for the Seventh Circuit. 61 Of
particular interest, Judge Posner wrote a dissent from denial of rehearing en
banc,62 warning that Judge Wood's opinion was "flouting conventional statute
of limitations principles, forging a lonely path, and creating more work for the
Supreme Court, which now faces an intercircuit conflict on a recurrent
issue .. .. 63 Yet Justice Scalia dispatched the issue fairly easily in a 10-page
opinion, making no mention of a conflict among the federal circuits.
The interesting bi-play in these cases between the Seventh Circuit and
the Supreme Court, like earlier cases discussed here, has received little
attention or public comment. Had these cases involved the Ninth Circuit,
however, there might have been substantial discussion and even criticism of
the appellate record.
IV. THE CULT OF THE JUDGES AND CIRCUIT REPUTATION
A final question to consider is what role the reputation of individual
judges plays in the status and treatment of different circuits. To examine this
question, consider the most visible judges from the two Circuits.
Much of the criticism of the Ninth Circuit has focused on Judge Stephen
Reinhardt. This goes back more than a decade, when the conservative
magazine, The Weekly Standard, published an article entitled, "The Judge the
Supreme Court Loves to Overturn. ' 64 More recently, InsideCounsel
Magazine, a publication that serves corporate counsel, published an article
entitled Holding Court, which examined circuit judges who are having an
impact on the law. About Judge Reinhardt, the article said, "Few attorneys

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007).
The lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 430.
Id. at 434.
Matt Rees, TheJudge theSupreme CourtLoves to Overturn,THEWEEKLY STANDARD, May 5, 1997,
availableat http://www.theweeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/001/414ilyss.asp
(last visited Apr. 3, 2008). Apparently the magazine reposted the article on its web site in recent
years with a new intro line that says, "From the May 5, 1997 issue: Judge Stephen Reinhardt was
notorious long before his 9th Circuit's Pledge of Allegiance decision."
The latter reference is to Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466 (2003), rev 'd on othergrounds
sub nom. Elk Grove Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 540 U.S. 945 (2003) (Judge Reinhardt was a
member of the panel that ruled against the Pledge of Allegiance but in which he did not write the
panel opinion.).
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have a neutral opinion about Judge Stephen Reinhardt. Loved by the left and
loathed by the right, Judge Reinhardt
has a well-earned reputation for being
65
judge.,
liberal
most
the nation's
Consider, then, how the most prominent members of the Seventh Circuit
are portrayed. The InsideCounselarticle says of Judge Richard A. Posner, that
he is "an intellectual behemoth-not only is he a leading legal scholar, but also
a well-known economic thinker . . . Judge Posner's intellectual cachet
translates to national influence. 6 6 That is one of dozens, perhaps hundreds,
of articles singing the praises of Judge Posner.
His colleague on the Seventh Circuit, now Chief Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook, is treated almost as well. A profile when he became chiefjudge
said he was "recognized by scholars as a leading intellect in the
judiciary .... 67 The prolific nature of both men has been studied and
commented upon in law reviews and elsewhere. Posner ranked first and
Easterbrook second in a study of the number of opinions published by appeals
court judges from 1998 to 2000.68 In addition, Judge Posner has written
numerous books while maintaining his reputation as the most prolific producer
of court opinions. The respect for their decisions and other writings extends
all the way to the Supreme Court, where both Judges Posner and Easterbrook
are mentioned in Supreme Court decisions more often than Judge Reinhardt.6 9
Small wonder, then, that with the intellectual, almost cult-like following
for Judges Posner and Easterbrook, that the Seventh Circuit faces relatively
little public scrutiny and attention to its record in the Supreme Court. And
this is so, even when the Seventh Circuit has what might be considered a very
poor showing in the October Term 2005.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Adele Nicholas, Holding Court, INSIDECOUNSEL MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/section/litigation/I333 (last visited on Apr. 3, 2008).
Id.
Maria Kantzavelos, Judge EasterbrookTakes Commandof7th Circuit,CHICAGO LAwYER, January,
2007, at 12.
StephenJ. Choi&Mitu Gulati, Mr. JusticePosner?UnpackingtheStatistics,61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv.
AM. L. 19, Table 1 (2005).
Judge Reinhardt's name appears 20 times in U.S. Supreme Court decisions, according to a Westlaw
search; almost all are simply references noting that he wrote the Ninth Circuit opinion on which the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari.
Judge Easterbrook's name appears 57 times in Supreme Court opinions, although he has been on the
bench for five fewer years than Judge Reinhardt. Among the 57, 15 are references to articles or
books Judge Easterbrook has written, most on antitrust or securities law; 33 are substantive
references to or discussions of Easterbrook opinions; and only 9 are references to his opinions on
which certiorari was granted.
Judge Posner's name appears 99 times in a court tenure that is one year shorter than Reinhardt's.
Judge Posner has been cited 42 times for his books and articles, 52 times in discussion of his
decisions or work on judicial committees, and 6 times to note the granting of certiorari.
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One interesting measure of regard for the Seventh Circuit is found in an
unusual quarter. In law student notes and comments, the Seventh Circuit
attracts a substantial amount of attention, and much of it is not favorable. For
example, a comment in the St. John'sLaw Review took the Seventh Circuit to
task for limiting the freedom of speech and press of college journalists, a
decision written by Judge Easterbrook 0 . Another critical example is a Yale
Law Journal comment on a ruling by Judge Posner rejecting a reporter's
privilege. 7 A number of critical case comments have appeared in the Harvard
Law Review and elsewhere.72 One recent example faulted an opinion by Judge
Posner ruling that police use of a Global Positioning Device (GPS) to monitor

70.

71.
72.

Joe Murphy, Bait and Switch in Hosty v. Carter: The Seventh Circuit's Recipefor Limiting Free
Speech Rights of College Journalists by Extending the "Hazelwood Doctrine" and Misusing
QualifiedImmunity, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 429 (2007) (discussing Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731
(7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1169 (2006)).
Jaynie Randall, FreeingNewsgatheringfromthe Reporter'sPrivilege, 114 YALE L. J. 1827 (2005)
(discussing McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003)).
See Civil Procedure Class Action Certifications-Seventh Circuit Holds that Denial of Class
CertificationCan HavePreclusiveEffect in State and FederalCourts-InRe Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., Tires Products Liability Litigation,333 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV. 2031,
2035 (2004) (criticizing Easterbrook for bucking stare decisis and adopting a rule that "would
unfairly and unwisely stake the viability of a class action on the outcome of a ruling that by its nature
is tentative and subject to discretion"); Criminal Law-ExclusionaryRule-Inevitable Discovery
DoctrineSeventh CircuitHolds that the Inevitable DiscoveryDoctrineDoes Not Apply to Evidence
Seized in ImpermissibleSearch ofa ThirdParty-UnitedStates v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir.
2004), 118 HARV. L. REv. 794 (2004) (criticizing Posner for unnecessarily broadening the scope of
the exclusionary rule to include instances where its application would have no significant deterrent
effect); Diversity Jurisdiction-Definitionof Corporation Under 28 US.C. § 1332(c)-Seventh
Circuit Holds that the Term "Corporation"Is Entirely State-Defined-Hoaglandv. Sandberg,
Phoenix & Von Gontard,P.C., 385 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2004), 118 HARv. L. REv. 1347 (2005)
(suggesting Posner misinterpreted precedent, thus creating a rule that violates legislative intent and
muddies the state and federal roles in determining diversity jurisdiction); Criminal
Law-Postsentence Administration-Seventh Circuit Upholds Federal Bureau of Prisons
Interpretationof FederalGood Conduct Time Statute-White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997 (7th Cir.
2004), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2037 (2005) (stating that the Seventh Circuit's wrongful characterization
of the statute at issue led to a needlessly complex holding for a relatively simple statutory
interpretation); ConstitutionalLaw--FirstAmendment-Seventh CircuitHolds thatPublic University
Cannot Refuse to Recognize Student Group Based on Group's Violation of School
NondiscriminationPolicy-ChristianLegal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006), 120
HARV. L. REV. 1112 (2007) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit for failing to uphold derecognition of a
campus group even though the sanction did not infringe on First Amendment rights, thus cutting off
an avenue for the advancement of nondiscrimination in public schools); Tort Law-LiabilityInsurers
and Defense Costs-Seventh Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Insurer's Legal Malpractice Suit-TIG
Insurance v. Griffin Winning Cohen & Bodewes,'P.C., 444 F.3d 587 (7th Cir.2006), 120 HARV. L.
REv. 1715 (2007) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit for basing its decision on a relatively minor point
and failing to address the crux of the problem presented by the case). See also Brendan J. Hammer,
Tainted Love: What the Seventh Circuit Got Wrong in Muth v. Frank,56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1065
(2007) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit for its narrow reading of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) and restricting its protections for sexual relations between consenting adults).
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the movement of a suspect's vehicle was not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.73
V. CONCLUSION
The subject of Supreme Court reversals of circuit court opinions is a
complex and nuanced one that should not turn on statistical analysis which
provides fuel for liberal-conservative ideological debate. It is simply too easy
to reduce the qualitative aspect of judicial decisionmaking to slogans and
jargon that misses the complexity of the enormous task this country asks of its
judicial system.

73.

Recent Case: Seventh CircuitHolds That GPS Tracking is Not A Search, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2230
(2007) (discussing United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), cert. denied sub. nom.
Garcia v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 291 (2007)).
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APPENDIX I
Supreme
Court Term

Overall
Reversal
Rate

1984

65%

1985

59

40 (5)

62 (16)

83 = 5th, 8th

1986

63

60 (5)

42(19)

100 = 10th

1987

53

80 (5)

47 (17)

80 = 7th

1988

47

50(10)

58(19)

100 = 10th

1989

59

60 (5)

47(15)

100 = 6th

1990

61

75 (8)

77 (13)

1st, IOth = 100

1991

66

60 (5)

69(13)

100 = 6th, D.C.

1992

60

50 (6)

63 (24)

86 = 4th

1993

50

38 (8)

73 (15)

73 = 9th

1994

65

28 (7)

82 (17)

100 = 8th

1995

58

57 (7)

83 (12)

100 = 5th

1996

71

100 (3)

95 (21)

100 = lst, 2nd, 7th

1997

60

57 (7)

82(17)

100 = 6th, lth

1998

69

80 (5)

75 (16)

88 =11th

1999

58

75 (8)

90(10)

100 = 2nd

2000

67

50 (4)

75 (16)

100 = 1st, l1lth, D.C.

2001

75

0 (2)

76 (17)

100 = 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 11 th

2002

74

50 (2)

75 (24)

100 = 2nd, 4th, 5th, 10th

2003

76

50 (4)

77 (22)

100 = 2nd, 5th, 10th, 11th, D.C.

2004

71

50 (2)

83 (18)

100 = 1st, 2nd, 10th

2005

70

100 (3)

86 (14)

100 = Ist, 3rd, 7th, D.C.

2006

74

67 (3)

90 (21)

100 = 3rd, 90 = 9th, 80 = 5th

7th Circuit
Reversal
Rate

9th Circuit
Reversal
Rate

60% (10)

74% (27)

Worst Reversal Rate

100% = 5th, D.C.

1st, 10th

Note: This chart is adapted from the annual statistics reported by the NationalLaw Journal.The
statistics include per curiam summary decisions. Column Two reflects the overall reversal rate
by the Supreme Court, term by term. Column Three reflects the reversal rate of the Seventh
Circuit by the Supreme Court, with the number in parentheses providing the total number of cases
from the Seventh Circuit. Column Four provides comparison data for the Ninth Circuit, also with
the total number of cases from that circuit in parentheses. Column Five shows the worst circuit
reversal rates for each term.
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APPENDIX II
Reversal Rates Terms '84-'06
1st (25 of 45)

55.5% reversed

2nd (77 of 127)

60.62

3rd (57 of 120)

47.5

4th (81 of 136)

59.55

5th (98 of 161)

60.86

6th (102 of 157)

64.96

7th (71 of 123)

57.72

8th (76 of 122)

62.29

9th (294 of 403)

72.95

10th (56 of 88)

63.63

11th (79 of 136)

58.08

D.C. (60 of 98)

61.22

Total (1076 of 1716)

62.7%

Note: The statistics in this chart are adapted from the annual statistics published by the
NationalLaw Journal.

